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STANDARDS FOR THE SUPREME COURT *
The Honorable John Cornyn **
One important lesson learned during this past election year is
that the American people want a return to basic American values,
and an end to vicious, Michael Moore-style politics. Certainly the
last thing Americans want is yet another year of incessant, base-
less, and venomous attacks.
But if liberal special-interest groups in Washington have their
way, more vicious politics is exactly what the American people will
get, particularly in the likely event of a vacancy on the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The American people want judges and justices on the bench who
will dutifully interpret the law-distinguished legal minds and de-
voted public servants who will help implement, not make, political
decisions, and who know the difference between personal opinion
and professional duty.
But some special-interest groups do not want that. Having failed
to advance their policies democratically at the ballot box in No-
vember, these groups now hope to achieve their ends in the court-
room and to impose their views on the country by judicial fiat.
* An earlier version of this Article was originally published on the National Review
Online website on November 23, 2004. John Cornyn, Injudicious Battles: Is There Any Stop-
ping the Judge Madness in the Senate?, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 23, 2004, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/cornyn200411230833.asp (last visited Jan. 15,
2005). © 2004 by National Review Online, www.nationalreview.com. Reprinted and revised
with permission.
** United States Senator (R-TX) and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution,
Civil Rights and Property Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate; Attor-
ney General, State of Texas, 1999-2002; Justice, Supreme Court of Texas, 1991-1997. B.A.,
1973, Trinity University; J.D., 1977, St. Mary's University School of Law; LL.M., 1995, Uni-
versity of Virginia School of Law.
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Of course, they will not say so in public. Instead, they will try to
distort the records of this President's well-qualified judicial nomi-
nees in an effort to defeat their confirmation.
One favorite tactic has been to attack the two distinguished ju-
rists whom President Bush has frequently heralded as models of
jurisprudence: Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.1 The judicial
philosophy of these two fine Justices-a philosophy that respects
and promotes democracy and returns decision-making to the peo-
ple and to the states, rather than set national policy by judicial
fiat-has even been condemned as downright hostile to civil
rights .2
But consider the source of these attacks.
These are the same groups who claim that your civil rights are
being violated whenever a public-school teacher recites the Pledge
of Allegiance,3 a county clerk issues a wedding license only to the
union of one man and one woman,4 or a soldier allows a Boy Scout
troop onto a military base.5
These are the same groups that seek judges who will ignore the
three-strikes-and-you're-out law when sentencing convicted crimi-
nals,6 invalidate consensus laws like the partial-birth-abortion
1. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Vows to Seek Conservative Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29, 2002, at A24 (noting that Bush has "singled out Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence M.
Thomas ... as justices whom he held in high regard").
2. See, e.g., Saveourcourts.org, The Scalia-Thomas Record on Civil Rights and Equal
Opportunity, at http://saveourcourts.civilrights.org/the-facts/scaliathomas.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 23, 2005) (describing Justice Scalia and Thomas as having "extreme views" on civil
rights issues).
3. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004); see also Press
Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Urges Supreme Court to Uphold Ruling
Removing the Phrase "Under God" from Pledge of Allegiance Recited in Public Schools (Mar.
24, 2004), at http://www.aclu.org/court/court.cfm?ID=15298&c=261 (last visited Jan. 23,
2005).
4. See Christina Bellantoni, ACLU Sues to Allow Gay "Marriage," WASH. TIMES, July
8, 2004, at B1.
5. See Associated Press, Military Bases are Told Not to Sponsor Boy Scout Troops,
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2004, at A8.
6. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, After High Court Upholds
Harsh "Three Strikes" Sentencing Law, ACLU of Southern CA Vows Reform Efforts (Mar. 3,
2003), at http://www.aclu.org/CriminalJustice/CriminalJustice.cfm?ID=12054&c=52 (last
visited Feb. 7, 2005) (stating that the ACLU national office and its California affiliate
served as co-counsel for the defendant in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), one of two
Supreme Court cases attempting to invalidate the California "three strikes" law). The Su-
preme Court also upheld the "three strikes" law in the Andrade companion case, Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
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ban,7 and block school-choice programs designed to expand educa-
tional opportunities to minority communities.'
Moreover, their analysis of the law is as flawed as their views on
policy. Consider these examples:
a) Rights of the Accused. The judicial philosophy of Justices
Scalia and Thomas has led to numerous decisions favoring crimi-
nal defendants, notwithstanding the contrary views of some of
their colleagues. In Blakely9 and Apprendi,1 ° they authored or
joined 5-4 majorities recognizing a robust right to jury trial under
the Sixth Amendment. In Kyllo, 1 Justice Thomas joined Justice
Scalia's 5-4 majority opinion expanding Fourth Amendment pro-
tections against government searches based on new technologies.12
Justice Scalia's dissent in Maryland v. Craig,1" decided before Jus-
tice Thomas joined the Court, championed a broader Sixth
Amendment right of criminal defendants to confront their accusers
than that ultimately adopted by the Court.
14
b) Employment Discrimination. Fidelity to text and precedent
has also led Justices Scalia and Thomas to favor employees in nu-
merous employment discrimination cases. For example, they advo-
cated a broader interpretation of the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act favoring the employee, and dissented from the
Court's decision in favor of the employer in Cline." Both Justices
7. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU and National Abortion
Federation Vow to Defend Federal Abortion Ban Victory as DOJ Pursues Appeal (Jan. 15,
2005), at http://www.aclu.orglnews/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=17333&c=148 (last visited Jan. 23,
2005) (discussing the ACLU's attempts to repeal the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003).
8. See Zelman v. Simmon-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (listing the ACLU and People for
the American Way Foundation as co-counsel and ruling against these groups in holding that
Ohio's scholarship program was not a violation of the Establishment Clause and that Ohio
could continue providing tuition-assistance to qualifying students irrespective of whether
the students attended religious or secular schools).
9. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004).
10. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
11. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of a device that is
not in "general public use" to explore the details of the home that would otherwise have
been unknowable without physical intrusion qualifies as a "search" and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant).
12. Id. at 40-41.
13. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860-61 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Constitution provides "with unmistakable clarity" that "in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against them").
14. Id. at 859-60 (holding that permitting an alleged sexual abuse victim to testify by
closed circuit television would not violate the alleged perpetrator's Sixth Amendment right
to confrontation).
15. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 601-13 (2004) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing against the Court's holding that the ADEA does not pro-
hibit favoring the old over the young).
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have authored a number of the Court's leading opinions faithfully
construing race and sex employment discrimination laws in favor
of employees, including Oncale,"6 Costa,17 Swierkiewicz, is and Rob-
inson v. Shell Oil.19
c) First Amendment. Justice Thomas has been recognized by le-
gal scholars across the political spectrum as a stalwart champion
of free speech,2 ° while Justice Scalia provided the critical fifth vote
in Texas v. Johnson,2 the landmark flag-burning case issued prior
to Justice Thomas's arrival on the Court. Justice Scalia joined Jus-
tice Thomas's 6-3 opinion in Good News Club22 ensuring equal ac-
cess to public-school facilities by a religious group as a matter of
free speech, as they had similarly held in Rosenberger.2 And both
Justices joined the Court's 5-4 decision upholding the ability of
minority communities to enjoy educational choice, including equal
access to parochial schools.24
These and countless other decisions demonstrate how mislead-
ing it is to examine the work of judging through the narrow, parti-
san political lens advocated by these liberal special-interest
groups. In fact, the job of a judge is to decide one case at a time,
applying the existing law-whether a law written by Congress or a
judicial precedent-to the facts, without regard to who wins or who
loses. In other words, results-oriented decision-making is the oppo-
16. Oncale v. Sundown Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that sex discrimina-
tion consisting of same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII).
17. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (concluding that a "mixed-motive"
jury instruction is allowed so long as the employee can present sufficient evidence for a rea-
sonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice).
18. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (holding that in order to survive
a motion to dismiss an employee only needs to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted and not plead more facts than ultimately needed to succeed on the merits).
19. Robinson v. Shell Oil, Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (holding that the term "employee" in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 included former employees).
20. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas: The Emergence of a Com-
mercial-Speech Protector, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 485, 487 (2002) (stating that "Justice Cla-
rence Thomas has evolved into an ardent defender of commercial free-speech rights, becom-
ing an even more forceful advocate for commercial speech than his luminous predecessor
[Justice Thurgood Marshall]").
21. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that burning the American flag is a
protected form of political expression under the First Amendment).
22. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that the exclu-
sion of a religious group from a limited public forum was a violation of the group's free
speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justified the exclusion).
23. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding
that the state university's exclusion of a student publication from participating in a student
activities fund solely on the basis of the publications religious viewpoint was content dis-
crimination and a violation of the First Amendment).
24. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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site of what a good judge does. No good judge twists the law or the
facts to assure a particular outcome, and it is wrong for anyone to
suggest that it is appropriate that they should.
Judges regularly find themselves on opposite sides of an issue;
court decisions are often divided. Indeed, Justices Scalia and Tho-
mas frequently disagree.
But it's offensive and wrong to say that one Justice is hostile to
civil rights while another Justice is pro-civil rights, just because
they happen to disagree from time to time. For example, it's wrong
to say that the cases noted above prove that Justices Scalia and
Thomas are pro-civil rights, while their brethren are anti-civil
rights, just because they happen to disagree in those cases.
The American people also want a fair and reasonable process for
deciding who shall serve on the Supreme Court. Under our Consti-
tution, that means nomination by the President and confirmation
by a majority of the Senate. Throughout our nation's history, every
judicial nominee who has received the support of a majority of
senators has been confirmed.26
President Bush's nominees to the federal courts have enjoyed
the support of a bipartisan majority of senators. Unfortunately,
during this past Congress, a partisan minority of senators tram-
pled upon two centuries of Senate tradition upholding the doctrine
of majority rule. They have filibustered ten judicial nominees-for
the first time in our nation's history-in order to prevent President
Bush's nominees from receiving an up-or-down vote on the floor of
the Senate.27
25. See, e.g., Will Baude, Brothers in Law?, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE (June 30, 2004),
at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?pt=VynlWOmi2qD22%2FvcelbyER%3D%3D (last visited
Jan. 23, 2005) (describing notable jurisprudential disagreements between Justices Scalia
and Thomas, including the recent Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Ashcroft v. ACLU decisions, and
stating that "Thomas regularly breaks with Scalia, disagreeing on points of doctrine, finding
a more measured and judicial tone, and calling for the elimination of bad law").
26. See, e.g., John Cornyn, Our Broken Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster
Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 224-25 (2003) (listing the recent judicial nominees
who garnered the support of fewer than sixty senators yet the Senate still acted to confirm
the nominee by the necessary majority).
27. See, e.g., Charles Babington, GOP Moderates Wary of Filibuster Curb, WASH. POST,
Jan. 16, 2005, at A5; Carl Hulse, Frist Warns on Filibuster over Bush Nominees, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2004, at A21.
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Some Senators are now even claiming that they should have a
role in selecting the next nominee to the Supreme Court.2" The
President, of course, is entitled to consult with whomever he
wants, but cooperation is a two-way street, and one can certainly
understand a president's reluctance to take advice from those who
have obstructed his finest nominees.29
Moreover, the Constitution is clear: The president, alone, nomi-
nates judges.30 The Senate has an important advice-and-consent
function, but that function applies only to the confirmation, and
not the nomination, of judges. 1 Much has been made of the word
"advice," but as early Senate practice teaches, the Senate's consti-
tutional function is simply to "advise" whether it considers a par-
ticular appointment to be a good idea and, separately, to "consent"
to that appointment regardless of the Senate's own advice. (For
example, when the Senate, for the first time, exercised its advice-
and-consent function with respect to a treaty, it resolved "[tihat
the Senate do consent to the said convention, and advise the Presi-
dent of the United States to ratify the same.")32
28. See Letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy to President George W. Bush (June
25, 2003), reprinted in From the Bag: Irrecusable & Unconfirmable, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 277,
281-83 (2004), available at http://www.kennedy.senate.gov/index high.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2005) ("I'm writing to express my hope that in considering potential nominees...
you will consider the example of earlier Presidents who . . .fully respected the role the
Framers gave the Senate to share with the President."); Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy
to President George W. Bush (June 11, 2003), at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/
press/200306/061603.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) ("I write to urge you to engage[] in
meaningful consultation with Members of the Senate, including those in the other party,
before deciding on nominees."); Letter from Senator Harry Reid to President George W.
Bush (Dec. 3, 2004), at http://reid.senate.gov/record.cfn?id=229302 (last visited Feb. 2,
2005) ("[T]he power to make lifetime appointments to the Supreme Court and the lower fed-
eral courts is a shared power."); Letter from Senator Charles E. Schumer to President
George W. Bush (June 10, 2003), at http://www.schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWeb
site/pressroom/press releases/PRO1772.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) ("The Constitution
dictates that federal judges be nominated by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate.").
29. Letter from Senator John Cornyn to President George W. Bush (June 17, 2003), re-
printed in From the Bag: Irrecusable & Unconfirmable, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 277, 283-84 (2004),
available at http://cornyn.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=213077 (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate ... Judges of the su-
preme Court, and all other Officers of the United States.").
31. Id. ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the su-
preme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . ."); see also John Cornyn, Edito-
rial, Advice and Consent -- After the Fact, WASH. POST, July 1, 2003, at A12.
32. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 55 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also David P. Currie,
The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure of Government, 1789-
1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 180 (1995) (describing the approval of the nation's
first treaty, a consular agreement that Thomas Jefferson had concluded with France in No-
vember 1788).
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When our last President, Bill Clinton, was presented with two
vacancies on the Supreme Court, both of his nominees were given
up-and-down votes and confirmed.33 Neither was filibustered by a
partisan minority-despite their clear liberal leanings. Both are
distinguished jurists--one, a former general counsel of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union who had written that traditional mar-
riage laws are unconstitutional,34 and the other, a former Democ-
ratic chief counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee.3
Should President Bush be presented with a vacancy on the Su-
preme Court during his second term in office, his nominee should
be granted at least that same courtesy.
A vacancy on the Supreme Court could occur at any time. A re-
tirement could be announced at the end of the Court's session in
June or July. Or one could be announced in March or April, as was
done in 1993 and 1994, thereby giving the President and the Sen-
ate additional time to consider a nominee. Finally, a vacancy could
arise tragically due to a medical problem.
But whatever the time frame for a Supreme Court vacancy, the
process for selecting a successor must reflect the best of our Ameri-
can judiciary, and not the worst of American politics.
33. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 316-26 (rev. ed. 1999)
(describing the confirmations of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer).
34. See id. at 319; RUTH BADER GINSBURG & BRENDA FEIGEN FASTEAU, REPORT OF
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT: THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN
UNDER FEDERAL LAW 72 (1974) (stating that bigamy law is "of questionable constitutional-
ity since it appears to encroach impermissibly upon private relationships"); see also John
Cornyn, Restoring our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 17
n.50 (2003).
35. See ABRAHAM, supra note 33, at 323-24.
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